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The coevolution of cultural groups and ingroup favoritism
Abstract
Cultural boundaries have often been the basis for discrimination, nationalism, religious wars, and
genocide. Little is known, however, about how cultural groups form or the evolutionary forces behind
group affiliation and in-group favoritism. Hence, we examine these forces and show that arbitrary
symbolic markers, though initially meaningless, evolve to play a key role in cultural group formation
and in-group favoritism because they enable a population of heterogeneous individuals to solve
important coordination problems. This process requires that individuals differ in some critical but
unobservable way and that their markers are freely and flexibly chosen. If these conditions are met,
markers become accurate predictors of behavior. The resulting social environment includes strong
incentives to bias interactions toward others with the same marker, and subjects accordingly show
strong in-group favoritism. When markers do not acquire meaning as accurate predictors of behavior,
players show a dramatically reduced taste for in-group favoritism. Our results support the prominent
evolutionary hypothesis that cultural processes can reshape the selective pressures facing individuals
and so favor the evolution of behavioral traits not previously advantaged.
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Cultural boundaries have often been the basis for discrimination, nationalism,
religious wars, and genocide. Little is known, however, about how cultural
groups form or the evolutionary forces behind group affiliation and in-group
favoritism. Hence, we examine these forces and show that arbitrary symbolic
markers, though initially meaningless, evolve to play a key role in cultural
group formation and in-group favoritism because they enable a population
of heterogeneous individuals to solve important coordination problems. This
process requires that individuals differ in some critical but unobservable way
and that their markers are freely and flexibly chosen. If these conditions are
met, markers become accurate predictors of behavior. The resulting social en-
vironment includes strong incentives to bias interactions toward others with
the same marker, and subjects accordingly show strong in-group favoritism.
When markers do not acquire meaning as accurate predictors of behavior,
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players show a dramatically reduced taste for in-group favoritism. Our results
support the prominent evolutionary hypothesis that cultural processes can re-
shape the selective pressures facing individuals and so favor the evolution of
behavioral traits not previously advantaged.
A cultural group is a group of people who share a set of beliefs, behavioral norms, and
behavioral expectations that is recognizably different from other groups (1). Beliefs, norms,
and expectations, however, are often not directly observable, and so by themselves they do
not provide a practical basis for identifying cultural groups in everyday social interactions.
Nonetheless, cultural groups are frequently identifiable because of ethnic markers, which are
arbitrary but observable traits like dress, dialect, and body modification that symbolically and
conspicuously signal group affiliation (1–5).
Symbolic traits of this sort can be crucial to social and economic outcomes. When ethnic
markers covary with other cultural traits, individuals can potentially use markers to everyone’s
mutual advantage as indicators of what would otherwise be unobservable variation in beliefs,
norms, and expectations. More nefariously, ethnic markers can lead to segregation, ethnic dis-
crimination, and persistent inequality, and this can happen even in the paradoxical cases when
everyone prefers integration (6–8) or when ethnicity indicates nothing about competence in a
given domain (9, 10). Indeed, parochialism and prejudice often mar intergroup relations. Peo-
ple show favoritism toward in-group members and indifference, hostility, or mistrust toward
out-group members (11–19). They do so even when groups are transient and group boundaries
rest on the flimsiest of distinctions among individuals (15, 20–22). These findings have poten-
tially broad significance because recent theoretical research has closely and surprisingly tied
out-group hostility to the evolution of human prosociality within groups (23,24).
None of this, however, explains how a group gets to be a group and why. The long tradition
of empirical research on intergroup relations (11–22,25) includes two basic approaches to defin-
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ing groups. Studies have either used pre-existing cultural groups, which formed beyond the ken
of the studies in question, or subjects were assigned to groups exogenously as part of an exper-
iment involving the effects of social categorization. These methods can be powerful for many
questions (12, 16), but they cannot expose the mechanisms behind the formation of cultural
groups. These mechanisms also represent a gap in evolutionary theories of human prosocial-
ity. Although the initial evolution of cultural groups may have little to do with cooperation,
much of the theory on the evolution of human prosociality relies heavily on the observation
that human populations are sub-divided into cultural groups (23,24, 26). This theoretical work,
however, simply imposes the required population structure exogenously. The endogenous for-
mation of cultural groups represents a plausible route to the required population structure that
figures prominently but remains unexplained in evolutionary theories of human prosociality.
We conducted a set of experiments to identify the conditions required for cultural groups
to form endogenously and for subjects to show in-group favoritism in their subsequent social
interactions. We used neither pre-existing cultural groups nor groups created exogenously by
the experimenter. Our task instead was to see if and when symbolically marked groups form
endogenously and whether their formation can lead to a preference for interactions with others
having the same symbolic marker. This preference was our operational measure of in-group
favoritism in the experiment, and more generally such preferences can limit social interactions
across cultural boundaries and potentially play a key role in the development of ethnocentric
attitudes (27). If such a preference were to emerge endogenously in our setting, the result would
support a central hypothesis in evolutionary social science (27–31). This hypothesis posits
that a cultural evolutionary process can modify the selective environment facing individuals
and so lead to the evolution, whether cultural or genetic, of traits that were not previously
advantageous. In our case, the question is whether the evolution of cultural groups during an
experiment can reconstitute the social environment to benefit in-group favoritism in a way that
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did not obtain at the beginning of the experiment.
Cultural groups form when variation in an unobservable but socially critical variable be-
comes manifest. Consider a population of players playing a simultaneous, two-person coordi-
nation game with multiple equilibria. Players can choose behavior A or B. If two players meet
and choose the same behavior, a large payoff results. If they choose different behaviors (32),
a small payoff results. Some players expect to coordinate on A, others B. If players with dif-
ferent expectations meet, an information problem results. One simply has to play the odds and
risk miscoordinating with someone who has incompatible expectations. This kind of problem
is general. Variation in behavioral norms and expectations is widespread (1, 33, 34), and the
mixing of people with different expectations occurs frequently (1, 35, 36). This mixing, how-
ever, creates the potential for people with discordant social expectations to meet, interact, and
miscoordinate. Variation in expectations, however, is not enough for the existence of cultural
groups because this variation is not directly observable.
Symbolic markers can change matters greatly, but only if they covary with expectations and
by extension behavior. To illustrate, let players in our coordination game wear shirts with either
triangles or circles. The shape on one’s shirt does not affect payoffs, and so it fills the theoret-
ical role of a symbolic marker. Consider a hypothetical population of 100 people, 50 of whom
expect to coordinate on A and 50 on B. In addition, the 50 players who expect to coordinate
on A have triangles on their shirts, and the 50 players who expect to coordinate on B have
circles. The distribution of behavior-marker types in the population is consequently 50 (A,!)
individuals, 0 (A,") individuals, 0 (B,!) individuals, and 50 (B,") individuals. The covari-
ation between behavior and marker is at its maximum possible value in this example, and the
markers perfectly reveal expectations and their associated behaviors in the coordination game.
More generally, when covariation characterizes the distribution of behavior-marker types, the
observable markers allow one to draw statistical inferences about what is unobservable but
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really important, namely behavioral expectations in a social setting with multiple equilibria.
When this is true, interacting preferentially with others having the same marker reduces the
probability of miscoordination and increases expected payoffs. The puzzle, however, is how to
get strong covariation endogenously in decentralized societies under limited information about
the distribution of behavior-marker combinations. How does symbolic meaning emerge in the
absence of fiat? Interestingly, mixing players with different expectations, which creates the
original problem, also creates a potential solution. It does so by producing small amounts of
covariation (see supporting on-line text) that can feed back into the system and accumulate
dynamically (37,38).
The accumulation of covariation requires more than mixing, however, because mixing by
itself often creates only a small amount of covariation between behavior and marker (37). Dur-
ing our experiment, individuals did not have information about the aggregate distribution of
behavior-marker combinations, and thus it would have been difficult or impossible to recognize
an initially weak relationship between behavior and marker. Covariation can increase, however,
if individuals link behaviors and markers in specific ways. Linkage refers to a tendency for an
individual either to retain both her current behavior and marker or to change both her behavior
and marker; what an individual does not do is change one trait but not the other. Linkage is
crucial because it preserves the covariation created by earlier mixing, while continued mixing
creates additional covariation that feeds back into the system and gets added to existing co-
variation. The result is that the total covariation accumulates, and this increases the economic
incentives to interact with others having the same marker. For covariation to accumulate, how-
ever, linkage should not be indiscriminate. Rather, theory suggests it should be more prevalent
in specific situations like those in which individuals acquire information about economically
successful behavior-marker combinations (37, 38). If individuals, however, never link under
any circumstances because they choose behaviors and markers independently, covariation is
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constantly destroyed, and markers cannot become strongly associated with behavior.
We conducted the following experiment to see if players would show a preference for (i)
linking behaviors and markers and for (ii) interacting with partners displaying the same marker.
In addition, we wanted to know (iii) whether linkage, if present, would generate sizable co-
variation between behavior and marker, which would then enable subjects to increase coordi-
nation via in-group favoritism. Players were assigned to one of multiple populations of 10.
We randomly subdivided these 10 players into two sub-populations of 5. Players within a sub-
population played one of two coordination games (Table S1). Each game had two pure-strategy
equilibria, and thus players had to solve a coordination problem. Both games had two behaviors
to choose from, A and B, but in sub-population 1 coordinating on A (41 points for each player
paired with another playing A) was better than coordinating on B (21 points for each player
paired with another playing B), while in sub-population 2 coordinating on B (41 points) was
better than coordinating on A (21 points). Miscoordinating in either sub-population brought
a small payoff (1 point). Payoffs were designed to draw players in different sub-populations
toward different behaviors and so mimic the variation in norms, preferences, and expectations
that often exists because of historical separation or important but unobservable environmental
differences.
To create a persistent coordination problem, players from the different sub-populations were
mixed, and they were never told to which sub-population they were assigned. If players had
remained in their initial sub-populations, the game would have posed little problem. Play-
ers would have soon figured out their respective situations, and presumably players in sub-
population 1 would have only chosen A, while players in sub-population 2 would have only
chosen B. Each period, however, a randomly selected player from sub-population 1 and a ran-
domly selected player from sub-population 2 switched sub-populations. All players knew this
would happen, but no one knew which two players had switched. In sum, each player had a
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strong incentive to develop accurate expectations about her current sub-population, but from
time to time she found herself in a new situation where her social expectations ran askew of
local norms.
Players could also condition social interactions on symbolic markers. In each period each
player chose one of two shapes, ! or ". A player’s payoff did not directly depend on her
shape, but players could use shapes to influence with whom they would play the coordination
game (38). The experiment lasted 80 periods. Each period proceeded as follows.
• Stage 1. Each player chose a payoff-relevant behavior, A orB, for the coordination game
and a payoff-irrelevant shape,! or ".
• Stage 2. An unidentified player from each sub-population switched sub-populations.
• Stage 3. Each player indicated whether she wanted to play the coordination game with
i) a randomly selected player with the same shape from her sub-population or ii) any
randomly selected player from her sub-population.
• Stage 4. Each player was paired using her choice in Stage 3 and received a payoff based
on her behavior, her partner’s behavior, and their sub-population.
To clarify our discussion of the results, when there was little or no covariation between behavior
and marker, we will call a set of individuals who shared the samemarker a “trivial” group. These
groups were trivial in the sense that the markers partitioned the population into circles and
triangles, but these markers did not reliably reflect any underlying variables affecting payoffs.
We will call a group “cultural,” in contrast, only when a set of individuals shared the same
marker after a sustained increase in the aggregate covariation between behavior and marker.
Groups were cultural in this case because markers did not simply partition the population into
circles and triangles; they also on average partitioned the population into those who expected to
coordinate on A versus those who expected to coordinate on B.
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The experiment consisted of two treatments. In the marker-randomized treatment, each
player was randomly assigned a shape after Stage 2 regardless of the shape chosen in Stage
1. In the marker-maintained treatment, each player retained her chosen shape. The marker-
randomized treatment was a control treatment in which marker randomization precluded the
possibility of the marker becoming an accurate predictor of behavior. The comparison be-
tween the two treatments shows (i) how much informational content the marker acquired in the
marker-maintained treatment beyond the baseline when markers were randomly assigned and
(ii) whether any differences in informational content translated into differences in the preference
for in-group favoritism.
Importantly, sub-populations were not equivalent to symbolically marked groups, whether
trivial or cultural. In a given period, a player’s sub-population was the pool of players available
for social interaction. A symbolically marked group, in contrast, was the set of players from
the entire population with the same marker. In short, the division of players into two sub-
populations, one favoring behavior A and the other behavior B, sustained variation in norms
and expectations. This variation, however, was not observable, and so it could not by itself serve
as a means of distinguishing one group from another. Symbolic markers, in contrast, were
observable traits, and they could serve as a means of distinguishing one group from another.
Markers, however, did not bear any necessary relationship to behavior and sub-population. The
significance of markers, in essence, could only emerge during the experiment as a result of
player choices. Markers had the potential to become the basis for determining cultural group
affiliation ex post, and indeed that was our question, but they were devoid of content ex ante.
For a sustained increase in covariation, individuals have to link the behavioral and marker
dimensions. We coded behavior-marker choices from Stage 1 of periods 2-80 as “linked” or
“unlinked.” A linked choice was one in which a player either retained her behavior and chosen
marker from the previous period or changed both. An unlinked choice was when she changed
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her behavior or marker but not both. A strong preference toward linked choices was present in
general (Figure 1), but it was significantly stronger in the specific case when a player received
the optimal coordination payoff in the previous period (conditional logit, p < 0.001, Table
S3). These linked choices consisted almost exclusively of choices in which the player retained
her behavior and marker from the previous period (Figures S1 and S2). In addition, although
the preference for linked choices after coordinating on the optimal behavior was present in
both treatments, it was significantly stronger in the marker-maintained treatment (conditional
logit, p < 0.001, Table S3). These results indicate that players showed a general tendency to
couple behaviors and markers. This tendency, however, was strongest when a player hit upon
a successful behavior-marker combination, and it was further reinforced and amplified in the
marker-maintained treatment when the marker was not prevented from acquiring meaning.
Substantial linkage at the individual level produces covariation between behavior and marker
at the aggregate level. If strong enough and specific enough, the linkage exhibited in the ex-
periment should have produced a significant increase in covariation in the marker-maintained
treatment, when it was possible, but not in the marker-randomized treatment, when it was not.
Even though linkage was present, however, covariation should have been similar in the two
treatments at the beginning of the experiment, before covariation had time to accumulate. Only
in later periods should the covariation have been significantly higher in the marker-maintained
treatment. The aggregate covariation between behavior and marker indeed followed this dynam-
ical pattern. During the first five periods the covariation was not different in the two treatments
(Welch two-sample t-test, df = 7.01, two-sided p = 0.68, Figure 2A), while in the final five pe-
riods the covariation was significantly higher in the marker-maintained case (Welch two-sample
t-test, df = 12.107, two-sided p < 0.001, Figure 2A). Covariation thus strongly and significantly
increased in the marker-maintained treatment but not in the marker-randomized case. This led
to a strong overall treatment difference in the accumulation of the markers’ predictive power
9
(Newey-West regression (39), p < 0.001, Figure 2A).
The presence of covariation does not mean that players will exploit it by assorting into
groups characterized by shared markers. Players could simply fail to recognize the association
between behavior and marker as it developed, or they could fail to recognize its usefulness.
Nonetheless players exhibited an increasing inclination to request partners with the same shape
as covariation accumulated. Throughout the marker-randomized treatment, players requested
same-shape partners roughly 50% of the time (Figure 2B), a result consistent with indifference
concerning the two interaction policies. In the marker-maintained treatment, however, play-
ers increasingly requested partners having the same shape as time passed. This increase was
highly significant (Newey-West regression, p < 0.001), and the vast majority of players (87%)
requested partners with the same shape in the final five periods (Figure 2B), indicating that
in-group favoritism became an almost universal phenomenon.
In the presence of covariation, this kind of in-group favoritism should lead to more co-
ordination and improved payoffs, but the strength of the effect will vary with the degree of
covariation and preferential assortment. A calculation of the mean payoff over periods for each
subject shows that payoffs were significantly different across the two treatments. The mean
payoff in the marker-randomized treatment was 20.819 points, and it was 27.454 in the marker-
maintained treatment (Welch two-sample t-test, df = 88.912, two-sided p < 0.001). This
difference, however, depended specifically on the dynamical increase in the markers’ predictive
content in the marker-maintained treatment, and this fact is central to our finding that the evolu-
tion of cultural groups changed the incentives associated with in-group favoritism. Specifically,
for those players who requested a partner with the same shape, the mean payoff per period
was not significantly different between the two treatments in the first five periods (Welch two-
sample t-test, df = 123.139, two-sided p = 0.1638), while it was highly significant in the final
five periods (Welch two-sample t-test, df = 105.733, two-sided p < 0.001). The higher overall
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payoffs in the marker-maintained treatment stemmed from an increase in coordinating on the
optimal behavior in each of the two sub-populations (Figure 3). A detailed analysis formally
confirms the dramatic and robust payoff effect that resulted from assorting on markers in the
marker-maintained treatment (supporting on-line text).
These results show how the evolution of cultural groups can reconstitute the social envi-
ronment and produce selection for an in-group bias that was not initially advantageous. If
selective pressures of this sort were common in past human societies, a plausible outcome
would arguably be a relatively inflexible bias leading individuals to prefer others similar in
some symbolic dimension. This idea is consistent with much research showing an astonish-
ing willingness for subjects to exhibit in-group favoritism when groups are based on trivial,
short-lived distinctions (12, 15, 16, 21, 22). For our study, this could mean the marker-based
assortment we documented largely reflected a readiness to favor the in-group that was already
in place when the subjects came to the lab, and it did not stem from the endogenous formation
of cultural groups during the experiment. In particular, although we found a dramatic differ-
ence in assortment dynamics in our two treatments, we still found a strong tendency to assort
in the marker-randomized treatment. This assortment was relatively meaningless with respect
to payoffs, but because requesting a partner with the same shape was free it is consistent with
two different motives on the part of players. Players could have simply been indifferent be-
tween two largely meaningless, cost-free social interaction policies, or they could have had a
strong residual taste for same-shape partners even when such pairings did not improve payoffs.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we conducted a second experiment with three
treatments, all of which required subjects to pay a small cost for in-group favoritism.
In the three treatments of our second experiment (supporting on-line text), subjects had to
pay a cost of 1 point when they requested and were successfully paired with a partner having the
same shape. To maximize the salience of the marker, all players retained their chosen markers
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in all treatments. In the payoff-equivalent treatment, the payoff structure was changed such
that coordinating on A or B yielded the same payoff (21 points) regardless of the players’
sub-population. Because the payoff structure in the sub-populations was identical in this case,
players did not differ in terms of some unobservable variable related to payoffs, and thus they
had no material problem the markers could help them solve. They could, of course, continue
to bias their interactions toward those having the same marker if willing to pay the cost. In the
fixed-marker treatment, players only chose a marker in the first period. This marker was then
retained for all 80 periods. In this treatment, markers were ostensibly similar to traits like race
that are often perceived as immutable. Because of this perceived immutability, which may or
may not be an accurate perception, such traits are especially prone to essentialist generalizations
and are thus prime candidates for generating in-group favoritism and out-group hostility (40).
A truly immutable marker, however, like the one we implemented, should not evolve to be a
stable predictor of behavior because individuals cannot adjust their markers to reflect changing
social circumstances. In the fixed-marker treatment, for example, players could benefit from
changing their expectations about where to coordinate when they changed sub-populations,
but they could not change their markers to signal their shifting expectations. Players could
nonetheless choose to assort on marker, if they wished. Lastly, as a new baseline, themodified
marker-maintained treatment was similar to the original marker-maintained treatment, but it
involved the same assortment cost used in the payoff-equivalent and fixed-marker cases.
As in the original marker-maintained treatment, the covariance between behavior and marker
accumulated at a significant rate through time in the modified marker-maintained treatment
(Newey-West (39) regression, maximal lag of 10, period trend t-test, p = 0.003). In early
periods, the covariance in the fixed-marker treatment was lower than in the modified marker-
maintained treatment, and this difference was marginally significant (z-test on Newey-West
estimated intercepts, p = 0.067). Furthermore, unlike the modified marker-maintained case,
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covariation did not accumulate through time in the fixed-marker treatment (Newey-West regres-
sion, lag of 10, period trend t-test, p = 0.294). The estimated time trend was slightly negative,
and this was significantly different from the positive trend in the modified marker-maintained
treatment (z-test on Newey-West estimated period coefficients, p = 0.002). In the payoff-
equivalent treatment, covariance was significantly lower in early periods than it was in the
modified marker-maintained treatment (z-test on Newey-West estimated intercepts, p < 0.001),
and it declined even further at a significant rate (Newey-West regression, lag of 10, period trend
t-test, p < 0.001). In this case, covariance actually declined all the way to 0 because all players
soon converged on A in all sub-populations. With no variation in behavior, covariation between
behavior and marker is not possible. Shared history was sufficient to form accurate expecta-
tions about where to coordinate, and the marker was not useful in this respect. In sum, trivial
groups became cultural groups in the modified marker-maintained treatment, but trivial groups
remained trivial in the payoff-equivalent and fixed-marker treatments.
Players, in turn, responded strongly to the resulting variation in the accumulated predic-
tive power of markers. In the modified marker-maintained baseline, roughly 55% - 60% of
the players requested partners with the same shape in later periods (Figure 4). In the payoff-
equivalent and fixed-marker treatments, however, only 15% - 25% assorted on shape in later
periods, and the differences relative to the baseline were highly significant (Figure 4). The
payoff-equivalent case is especially clear because, as mentioned above, all players eventually
played A in both sub-populations, and the predictive value of the markers went to zero as a
result. Correspondingly, the proportion of players requesting same-shape partners unraveled
relentlessly as the experiment progressed (Figure 4). The fact that assortment did not disappear
altogether suggests that perhaps a few players had a weak taste for assortment even when this
did not improve coordination. Altogether, however, our results show that the preference for
interacting with similarly marked players varied strongly according to whether markers became
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accurate predictors of behavior in the face of heterogeneous behavioral expectations. In short,
in-group favoritism had little to do with an unconditional preference for similarly marked part-
ners and a lot to do with whether trivial groups evolved into cultural groups. For this cultural
evolutionary transition to happen, two requirements had to be met. First, players had to differ
persistently in some important but unobservable dimension that could sustain symbolic repre-
sentation. Our payoff-equivalent treatment removed this feature, and assorting on shape steadily
declined through time. Second, the symbolic markers themselves had to be freely chosen and
mutable in a way that allowed an association between markers and unobservables to develop.
Our marker-randomized and fixed-marker treatments removed this feature, and assorting on
shape was relatively low in all periods when compared to their respective marker-maintained
treatments.
The research on intergroup processes has by and large suggested that people have a grim
willingness to show in-group favoritism, and in particular this holds even when groups are triv-
ial and evanescent (12, 13, 16–18, 20–22, 25). This research tradition, however, has in general
examined neither the evolutionary mechanisms behind group formation nor the impact of these
mechanisms on in-group favoritism. We, in contrast, implemented an experiment in which the
significance of groups had to arise, if at all, endogenously. In this setting, trivial groups re-
mained trivial under certain circumstances, but under other circumstances they developed into
cultural groups composed of individuals who shared both behavioral expectations and symbolic
markers signaling group affiliation. In-group favoritism was strongly associated with cultural
groups but not trivial groups. Our experiments made exclusive use of coordination games,
which serve as a kind of generic proxy for strategic settings with multiple equilibria. Many
strategic settings are characterized by multiple equilibria (41), and thus the dynamical pro-
cesses examined here have potentially broad significance. The mechanisms implicated in the
evolution of human prosociality, for example, often produce multiple equilibria (42,43), and so
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cooperation is a behavioral domain with considerable scope for the path-dependent evolution
of groups with different norms and expectations. In this sense cooperation can be analogous
to coordination. Even more generally, anytime people have a shared interest in distinguishing
among themselves in terms of their unobservable information (37), whatever that means in a
given situation, the logic behind the evolution of cultural groups holds.
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Figure 1: Summary of linked choices for the marker-randomized (gray) and marker-maintained
(black) treatments. The behavior and marker chosen in Stage 1 are coded as either linked or un-
linked relative to the behavior and marker chosen in Stage 1 of the previous period. Proportions
are plotted for the cases in which the player miscoordinated (M) in the previous period, coor-
dinated on the sub-optimal (C/S) behavior (i.e. A in sub-population 2 or B in sub-population
1), and coordinated on the optimal (C/O) behavior (i.e. A in sub-population 1 or B in sub-
population 2).
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Figure 2: (A) The informational content of the marker. The graph shows the mean magnitude
of the covariance between behavior and marker in a sub-population relative to the theoretical
maximum for the marker-randomized (line with filled circles) and the marker-maintained (solid
line) treatments. The period trend for marker-randomized is not significant (Newey-West (39)
regression, maximal lag of 10, t-test, p = 0.368), while it is highly significant for the marker-
maintained treatment (Newey-West, lag of 10, t-test, p < 0.001). (B) In-group favoritism, as
indicated by the proportion of players requesting a partner with the same shape. The marker-
randomized period trend is not significant (Newey-West, lag of 10, t-test, p = 0.868). The
marker-maintained period trend is highly significant (Newey-West, lag of 10, t-test, p < 0.001),
leading to large differences in in-group favoritism across treatments.
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Figure 3: Payoff proportions in the marker-maintained treatment (A) and the marker-
randomized treatment (B). The graphs show the distribution of players by period coordinat-
ing on the optimal behavior (black) given the sub-population (A in 1, B in 2), coordinating on
the sub-optimal behavior (gray) given the sub-population (A in 2, B in 1), or miscoordinating
(white). See supporting on-line text for a multinomial regression analysis.
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Figure 4: In-group favoritism for the modified marker-maintained (solid line), payoff-equivalent
(dashed line), and fixed-marker (line with open circles) treatments. Newey-West (39) regres-
sions indicate that the modified marker-maintained treatment began with more assortment than
the other two treatments, and the differences across treatments increased through time. Com-
paring regression results for the modified marker-maintained and payoff-equivalent treatments,
the intercepts are significantly different (z-test, p < 0.001), as are the period trends (z-test,
p < 0.001). Comparing results for modified marker-maintained and fixed-marker, both the
intercepts (z-test, p < 0.001) and period trends (z-test, p = 0.019) are significantly different.
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1 Experimental methods
For each session 30 subjects were divided randomly into three populations. The vast ma-
jority of subjects were students at the University of Zu¨rich or the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology. Students studying psychology were excluded from the subject pool. At
the beginning of each session subjects read instructions1 explaining how the game worked
as detailed below. After reading the instructions, all subjects had to answer several ques-
tions designed to ensure they understood the payoff structure, sub-population mixing, and
the use of shapes as a means of influencing coordination-game partners. Sessions would
1Instructions in German are available upon request.
1
not begin until all subjects had answered all questions correctly. Importantly, the fram-
ing for the use of shapes was neutral. The word “shape” was used exclusively, and any
questions about shapes were answered, as in the instructions, by simply stating that they
could be used to influence one’s partner according to the chosen interaction policy. Al-
together, the marker-randomized treatment consisted of 90 subjects divided into 9 popu-
lations, the marker-maintained treatment consisted of 60 subjects divided into 6 popula-
tions, the modified marker-maintained treatment 60 subjects divided into 6 populations,
the payoff-equivalent treatment 30 subjects into 3 populations, and the fixed-marker treat-
ment 30 subjects into 3 populations. All sessions lasted for 80 periods. Experiments were
conducted on a local computer network using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and data were
analyzed in R (R Development Core Team, 2006).
Initially each player in a population was randomly assigned to one of two sub-populations
(called “groups” in the actual experiment), and then the experiment began. As detailed in
the main text, the sequence of events within a period was the following.
• Stage 1. Each player chose a payoff-relevant behavior, A or B, for the coordination
game and a payoff-irrelevant shape,! or ".
• Stage 2. Two players switched sub-populations. One player was randomly selected
from sub-population 1, the other from sub-population 2.
• Stage 3. Each player indicated whether she wanted to play the coordination game
with i) a randomly selected player with the same shape from her sub-population or
ii) any randomly selected player from her sub-population.
• Stage 4. Each player was paired according to her choice from Stage 3 and re-
ceived a payoff based on her own behavior, the behavior of her partner, and the
sub-population they were occupying at the time.
Players played the coordination games shown in Tables S1 and S2. They only received
payoffs in their roles as players 1, and each player was player 1 once per period. For
example, if a player 1 named Rafael were to request a match with someone having the
same shape, a player 2 named Ernst from the same sub-population might be selected.
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Rafael would receive a payoff from this pairing, but Ernst would not. Ernst, however,
would separately play the role of player 1 once in the period. Moreover, Rafael might
be randomly selected as someone’s partner in the same period, but Rafael, as Player 2,
would neither know about this pairing nor receive a payoff. His behavior and marker, in
essence, would simply be drawn from an appropriate set of behavior-marker combinations
in the sub-population. This procedure ensured that each player only received one payoff
per period. In addition, if a player requested a match based on shape, but this was not
possible because she was the only player in her sub-population with her shape, the player
was simply matched randomly with any other player from the same sub-population. She
was told as much in Stage 4. Matching success rates, conditional on requesting a same-
shape partner, were 89.77% in the marker-maintained treatment and 94% in the marker-
randomized treatment.
Players were fully informed about the structure of the game. As the game proceeded,
the computer provided on-going updates about the current stage taking place and what
was happening. In particular, in Stage 1 of the marker-maintained and marker-randomized
treatments, players were provided in periods 2-80 with the following information: i) the
player’s own behavior, shape, and payoff from the previous period and ii) the behavior,
shape, and payoff from the previous period for a randomly selected other player from the
same sub-population. The rationale for providing information about a randomly selected
other was that the theory (Boyd and Richerson, 1987; McElreath et al., 2003) on which
the experiment was based has a social learning component involving the imitation of suc-
cessful individuals. Our analysis (see below) of linked choices, however, suggested that
the dominant learning effect was individual learning based on one’s own history. For this
reason, we changed the feedback in the second experiment to a more natural form in which
each player, in addition to her own information from the previous period, also received in-
formation on the behavior and marker of her partner. As with the random other of the first
experiment, the player’s partner of course was also from the same sub-population.
In the modified marker-maintained, payoff-equivalent, and fixed-marker treatments of
the second experiment, players requesting a partner with the same shape paid a cost of 1
point if this request was successfully implemented. Matching success rates, conditional on
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requesting a same-shape partner, were 92.35% in the modified marker-maintained treat-
ment, 94.26% in the payoff-equivalent treatment, and 96.49% in the fixed-marker treat-
ment.
In both experiments, after period 80 players answered a brief questionnaire and then
received their payments privately in Swiss Francs. The exchange rate was 50 points to the
Franc.
2 How mixing produces covariation
To illustrate how mixing produces covariation between behavior and marker, let players in
our coordination game wear shirts with either triangles or circles. The shape on one’s shirt
does not affect payoffs, and so it serves as a symbolic marker. Consider a hypothetical set
of five players with the maximum amount of covariation between behavior and marker:
{(A,!), (A,!), (A,!), (B,"), (B,")}.
Covariation is high here because the variation in both behaviors and markers is high, and
because each behavior has its own marker. A particular combination, (A,!) for example,
means the individual has an observable marker,!, and would commit to a specific behav-
ior, A, in the coordination game because this is where the individual expects to coordinate.
If an (A,!) person initiates an interaction with any random individual in her group, with
probability 1/2 she will be paired with someone having behavior A, yielding a large coor-
dination payoff, and with probability 1/2 she will be paired with someone having behavior
B, yielding a small miscoordination payoff. If she only initiates an interaction with another
triangle, she will coordinate with someone playing A with probability 1. Because behav-
ior and marker covary, the observable marker allows one to draw inferences about what
is unobservable but really important, namely expectations in a social setting with multiple
equilibria. Assorting positively into dyads based on the marker reduces miscoordination
and increases expected payoffs.
The puzzle is how to get covariation in decentralized societies under limited informa-
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tion about the distribution of behavior-marker combinations. Interestingly, mixing players
with different expectations, which creates the original problem, also creates a potential
solution. It does so by producing small amounts of covariation that can feed back into
the system and accumulate dynamically. Imagine a population historically subdivided
into two sub-populations that until recently had no contact with each other. At first there
is no covariation between behavior and marker within each sub-population, but the sub-
populations have different norms about where to coordinate. Let sub-population 1 have
90% A and 90% !. Sub-population 1 thus consists of 81% (A,!), 9% (A,"), 9%
(B,!), and 1% (B,"). Sub-population 2 has 90% B and 90% " with 81% (B,"), 9%
(B,!), 9% (A,"), and 1% (A,!). If players with different expectations never mix,
the marker is irrelevant. A player in sub-population 1 meets an A player with probability
0.9 and a B player with probability 0.1. Assorting based on markers cannot change this.
For example, someone with triangles on her shirt in sub-population 1 who assorts on the
marker will meet another A with probability 0.81/(0.81 + 0.09) = 0.9, exactly as if she
had ignored the marker.
To show how mixing gives the marker meaning, draw individuals from both sub-
populations. Most of the mixed sample will consist of (A,!) individuals from sub-
population 1 and (B,") individuals from sub-population 2, and so in the mixed sample
the marker will predict behavior. Specifically, let Bm, B1, B2, Mm, M1, and M2 be ran-
dom variables indicating behavior or marker in either the mixed sample, sub-population 1,
or sub-population 2. The relevant moments for the mixed sample, where µ indicates the
proportion of the mixed sample from sub-population 2, are
B¯m = (1− µ)B¯1 + µB¯2
M¯m = (1− µ)M¯1 + µM¯2
var(Bm) = (1− µ)var(B1) + µvar(B2) + µ(1− µ)(B¯1 − B¯2)
2
var(Mm) = (1− µ)var(M1) + µvar(M2) + µ(1− µ)(M¯1 − M¯2)
2
cov(Bm,Mm) = (1− µ)cov(B1,M1) + µcov(B2,M2) + µ(1− µ)(B¯1 − B¯2)(M¯1 − M¯2).
Although we are exploiting this result with a cultural interpretation related to ethnicity
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(Boyd and Richerson, 1987; McElreath et al., 2003), it is actually a classic result from the
study of structured populations in population genetics (Roughgarden, 1979). As the co-
variance equation above shows, mixing creates covariation when the two sub-populations
differ in any way in terms of their mean behaviors and mean markers (Boyd and Richer-
son, 1987). The dramatic differences in our example are not necessary; any random trivial
difference will do.
3 An analysis of linked and unlinked choices
Figure 1 in the main paper presents results showing a strong bias toward linked choices
when a player received 41 points (C/O) in the previous period. Table S3 shows regression
results. In addition to information about their own play, in the first experiment subjects
also had information about the behavior, marker, and payoff of a randomly selected other
player from the same sub-population. This allows for a conditional logit analysis that
further decomposes the tendency toward linked choices. Table S4 presents the results
from such an analysis. The decomposition uses predictors that code for the focal player’s
payoff in the last period, which is also true of the regression in Table S3, and the payoff of
the randomly selected player whose information was additionally provided in Stage 1 of
periods 2-80.
Finally, a linked choice in this analysis subsumes two situations: i) retaining both one’s
behavior and marker and ii) changing both one’s behavior and marker. An unlinked choice
also subsumes two situations: i) retaining one’s behavior and changing one’s marker and
ii) changing one’s behavior and retaining one’s marker. Figures S1 and S2 decompose
linked and unlinked choices into these four separate cases and show that, when a player
received 41 points in the previous period, the subsequent bias toward a linked choice was
almost exclusively a bias toward retaining the lagged behavior-marker combination.
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4 Payoff dynamics, detailed results
As shown in the main text, players in experiment 1 preferentially chose partners having
the same shape when covariation between behavior and marker was high. As a result
they coordinated more. When players coordinate more, it improves payoffs in two ways.
Most obviously, coordinating brings higher payoffs than miscoordinating. In addition,
coordinating can improve learning. When a player receives either 21 or 41 points, the
player can infer her current sub-population with certainty. This is not possible with a
payoff of 1. Consider someone playing B. If she receives 21 points, she knows she
is currently in sub-population 1 because the only way to get 21 points playing B is to
coordinate on B in sub-population 1. A payoff of 1, however, could indicate that the focal
player is in sub-population 2, but she was matched with a partner who thinks he is in 1
(e.g. a recent immigrant). Or it could indicate that the player in question has recently
switched to sub-population 1 herself, and she now has bad expectations. In the former
case, she should stick with B. In the latter case, she should switch to A. A payoff of 1 is
consistent with both scenarios and hence relatively uninformative. Coordination payoffs
do not have this ambiguity, and more coordination should allow players to track their
current sub-populations better. To test this, we asked each player to state in each period
which sub-population she thought she was in and calculated the proportion of correct
beliefs by player over the 80 periods. The proportion of periods in which players had
correct beliefs about their current sub-population was higher for the players in the marker-
maintained treatment. The mean proportion correct was 0.655 in the marker-randomized
treatment and 0.720 in the marker-maintained treatment (Welch two-sample t-test, df =
125.96, two-sided p < 0.001).
To analyze fully the payoff dynamics in the two treatments of experiment 1, we fit
several multinomial logit models to the data. Specifically, the payoff for individual i’s tth
observation (i.e. the payoff for a given player in given period) was coded as falling into
one of three categories. The dummy Π41,it ∈ {0, 1} records whether the payoff was the
optimal coordination payoff of 41. The dummy Π21,it ∈ {0, 1} records whether the payoff
was the sub-optimal coordination payoff of 21. Lastly, Π1,it = 1− Π41,it − Π21,it records
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if the payoff was the miscoordination payoff. Each model fit to the data returns two sets of
parameter estimates, β41 and β21, based on the specification ln{P (Π41,it = 1)/P (Π1,it =
1)} = β41 · xit and ln{P (Π21,it = 1)/P (Π1,it = 1)} = β21 · xit, where xit is a vector of
covariate values for the observation indexed by i and t.
The models included, in various combinations, the following covariates: i) dummies
for individual players (Ind. FE), ii) a dummy indicating participation in the marker-maintained
treatment (MM), iii) a period variable (i.e. 1-80) interacted with a dummy for the marker-
randomized treatment (t ×MR) and/or the marker-maintained treatment (t ×MM), iv) a
dummy indicating if the player successfully requested to be matched on shape interacted
with the marker-randomized dummy (SS × MR) and/or the marker-maintained dummy
(SS × MM), v) a dummy indicating whether the player’s beliefs about her current sub-
population were correct (BC), vi) a dummy indicating if the player migrated (e.g. switched
sub-populations) from one sub-population to the other (Mig.), and vii) the proportion of
players in the sub-population with the optimal coordination behavior (POB). Table S5
details the 12 models fit to the data.
As a model selection criterion, we used a derivative form (AICc) of Akaike’s criterion
(Akaike, 1973) discussed in Burnham and Anderson (2002, p. 66). Akaike’s criterion
is a statistical application of information theory (Cover and Thomas, 2006) that extends
maximum likelihood theory to the question of model selection. Specifically, when one fits
a model to data using likelihood, one loses information, in a quantifiable sense, because the
model does not fully account for all the processes that generated the actual data. Akaike’s
criterion and derivative criteria select the model estimated to lose the least amount of
information relative to the other models under consideration (Burnham and Anderson,
2002). Importantly, the Akaike-selected model does not depend on the order in which
models are considered. In practice AICc selects the model that has the best maximum
likelihood value adjusted for both the number of parameters estimated and the number of
observations. One can also rescale Akaike values by calculating Akaike weights. Akaike
weights are unit-free measures of fit. They sum to 1, and each Akaike weight specifies
the proportional weight of evidence in support of the associated model. Higher weights
signify more support, but the use of Akaike weights does not involve arbitrary cut-off
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points (e.g. p ≤ 0.05) as in hypothesis testing. The many advantages of information
theory in model selection are outlined in Burnham and Anderson (2002) and Forster and
Sober (1994).
As Table S5 shows, the overwhelming majority of the total Akaike weight is distributed
over models 7 and 10. These models are distinguished by the fact that they do not include
individual dummies, while they do include the interaction between period and the marker-
maintained dummy (t× MM), as well as the interaction between the marker-maintained
dummy and the dummy for a player successfully requesting a partner with the same shape
(SS × MM). Tables S6 - S8 show detailed results for models 10 and 7, the best-fitting
models, and model 1, the model with all possible predictor variables.
This analysis provides several detailed results. Here we focus on the average marginal
effects from model 7, which is very similar to the best fitting model 10 but includes a
couple of additional controls. The results from model 7 show that migrating in a given
period reduced the probability of receiving 41, exactly as we would expect if migrating
places an individual in a novel social situation where her expectations run askew of local
norms. When a player migrates, the expected reduction in the probability of receiving 41
averaged over the observed distribution for predictor variables (E[∆P41/∆XMig]) is -0.201
(z-test, p < 0.001).
The frequency of the optimal behavior in the relevant sub-population and the accu-
racy of the subject’s beliefs are also extremely important predictors. Specifically, with an
increase in the proportion of players exhibiting behavior A in a given sub-population 1
or B in a given sub-population 2, the marginal effect on the probability of receiving 21
points is negative (E[∂P21/∂XPOB] = −0.487, z-test, p < 0.001), while the marginal ef-
fect is positive for 41 points (E[∂P41/∂XPOB] = 0.957, z-test, p < 0.001). Intuitively,
when the optimal behavior is at high frequency in one’s sub-population, coordinating on
the sub-optimum happens with low probability, and coordinating on the optimum happens
with high probability. Having correct beliefs about one’s current sub-population also has
a negative effect on the probability of receiving 21 (E[∆P21/∆XBC] = −0.140, z-test,
p < 0.001) and a positive effect on the probability of receiving 41 (E[∆P41/∆XBC] =
0.319, z-test, p < 0.001). In short, when one’s beliefs are correct, one tends to choose the
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optimal behavior for one’s current sub-population. This reduces the probability of coor-
dinating on the sub-optimal behavior and increases the probability of coordinating on the
optimal behavior.
Controlling for the factors above and others, successfully requesting a partner with the
same shape in the marker-maintained treatment resulted in an increase in the probability of
receiving 21 points (E[∆P21/∆XSS×MM] = 0.078, z-test, p < 0.001) and a larger increase
in the probability of receiving 41 points (E[∆P41/∆XSS×MM] = 0.140, z-test, p < 0.001).
These effects are additional improvements that hold while controlling for the more ac-
curate beliefs and enhanced learning in the marker-maintained treatment. Requesting a
partner with the same shape in the marker-randomized treatment did not have an effect.
This was by design, of course, but altogether the analysis formally confirms that the joint
effect of participating in the marker-maintained treatment and requesting a match based
on shape is what brought an increase in payoffs. The results from models 10 and 1 show
that this conclusion is entirely robust.
Finally, we conducted an analogous multinomial logit analysis comparing the modi-
fied marker-maintained and fixed-marker treatments under the expectation that modified
marker-maintained results would be similar to marker-maintained, and fixed-marker re-
sults would be similar to marker-randomized. We did not include payoff-equivalent re-
sults because, unlike all other treatments, the response was binary in the payoff-equivalent
treatment. Moreover, as mentioned in the main text, after some initial noise, all players
soon settled on playing A in all sub-populations, and hence the results did not provide
much interesting variation to model.
Table S9 shows the results of the model selection exercise for the modified marker-
maintained and fixed-marker treatments in experiment 2. Models 1 and 4 are the best
fitting models. Interestingly, apart from the inclusion of individual fixed effects, these
two best fitting models have exactly the same predictors as the best fitting models for
experiment 1, further demonstrating the robustness of the effects observed in our experi-
ments. Table S10 shows the detailed results from fitting model 1 to the modified marker-
maintained and fixed-marker data, and these results are very similar to those from experi-
ment 1 (Tables S6 - S8).
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Table S1. Payoffs in points for player 1 (the row player) in sub-population 1 (left) and
sub-population 2 (right) in the marker-randomized, marker-maintained, fixed-marker, and
modified marker-maintained treatments.
A B A B
A 41 1 A 21 1
B 1 21 B 1 41
Table S2. Payoffs in points for player 1 (the row player) in sub-population 1 (left) and
sub-population 2 (right) in the payoff-equivalent treatment.
A B A B
A 21 1 A 21 1
B 1 21 B 1 21
Table S3. Linked and unlinked choices, experiment 1, basic analysis. See Figure 1 in the
main paper. Results are from a conditional logit model with subjects as the stratification
variable. A linked choice is coded as a positive result (i.e. 1). Covariates include i) a
period variable (t), ii) a period variable interacted with a marker-maintained dummy (t ×
MM), iii) dummies for the outcome of the focal player’s interaction in the previous period
(C/S means coordinated sub-optimally on A in sub-population 2 or B in sub-population,
and C/O means coordinated optimally on A in sub-population 1 or B in sub-population
2), and iv) these same dummies from (iii) interacted with the marker-maintained dummy.
One and two asterisks indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
Parameter Estimate p-value
t -0.001 0.547
t ×MM 0.02 ∗∗ < 0.001
C/S -0.127 0.388
C/O 1.068 ∗∗ < 0.001
C/S ×MM -0.035 0.872
C/O ×MM 1.204 ∗∗ < 0.001
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Table S4. Linked and unlinked choices, experiment 1, decomposed analysis. Results are
from a conditional logit model with subjects as the stratification variable. A linked choice
is coded as a positive result (i.e. 1). Covariates include i) a period variable (t), ii) a period
variable interacted with a marker-maintained dummy (t × MM), iii) dummies for payoff
combinations reported in Stage 1 (e.g. (41,1) means the decision maker received 41 in
the last period, the randomly selected other got 1), and iv) these same dummies from (iii)
interacted with the marker-maintained dummy (e.g. (41,1) ×MM). One and two asterisks
indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
Parameter Estimate p-value
t -0.002 0.505
t ×MM 0.021 ∗∗ < 0.001
(1,1) 0.480 ∗ 0.021
(1,21) 0.402 0.124
(1,41) 0.111 0.614
(21,1) 0.472 0.078
(21,41) 0.252 0.545
(41,1) 1.402 ∗∗ < 0.001
(41,21) 1.227 ∗ 0.016
(41,41) 1.426 ∗∗ < 0.001
(1,1) ×MM 0.174 0.610
(1,21) ×MM 0.481 0.267
(1,41) ×MM 0.310 0.364
(21,1) ×MM -0.154 0.721
(21,41) ×MM 0.600 0.274
(41,1) ×MM 1.197 ∗∗ 0.002
(41,21) ×MM 1.511 ∗ 0.036
(41,41) ×MM 1.523 ∗∗ < 0.001
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Table S6. Summary of multinomial logit model 10, experiment 1. Robust standard errors
are calculated using subjects as the clustering variable. One and two asterisks indicate
significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
Parameter Estimate Robust std. err. p-value Lower CI Upper CI
MM (21) -0.899 ∗∗ 0.249 < 0.001 -1.388 -0.411
t ×MM (21) 0.017 ∗∗ 0.004 < 0.001 0.010 0.025
SS ×MM (21) 1.490 ∗∗ 0.216 < 0.001 1.067 1.913
BC (21) -1.918 ∗∗ 0.163 < 0.001 -2.238 -1.599
Mig. (21) 0.174 0.099 0.079 -0.020 0.369
POB (21) -7.786 ∗∗ 0.234 < 0.001 -8.245 -7.327
Int. (21) 3.048 ∗∗ 0.124 < 0.001 2.806 3.291
MM (41) -0.705 ∗∗ 0.161 < 0.001 -1.020 -0.391
t ×MM (41) 0.011 ∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.017
SS ×MM (41) 1.347 ∗∗ 0.172 < 0.001 1.009 1.685
BC (41) 2.091 ∗∗ 0.154 < 0.001 1.789 2.393
Mig. (41) -1.550 ∗∗ 0.123 < 0.001 -1.792 -1.308
POB (41) 8.123 ∗∗ 0.222 < 0.001 7.688 8.557
Int. (41) -7.113 ∗∗ 0.186 < 0.001 -7.478 -6.748
15
Table S7. Summary of multinomial logit model 7, experiment 1. Robust standard errors
are calculated using subjects as the clustering variable. One and two asterisks indicate
significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
Parameter Estimate Robust std. err. p-value Lower CI Upper CI
MM (21) -0.991 ∗∗ 0.271 < 0.001 -1.523 -0.460
t ×MR (21) -0.001 0.002 0.540 -0.006 0.003
t ×MM (21) 0.017 ∗∗ 0.004 < 0.001 0.010 0.025
SS ×MR (21) -0.077 0.125 0.538 -0.321 0.168
SS ×MM (21) 1.490 ∗∗ 0.216 < 0.001 1.067 1.914
BC (21) -1.918 ∗∗ 0.163 < 0.001 -2.237 -1.599
Mig. (21) 0.177 0.100 0.075 -0.018 0.373
POB (21) -7.796 ∗∗ 0.234 < 0.001 -8.255 -7.336
Int. (21) 3.144 ∗∗ 0.164 < 0.001 2.822 3.466
MM (41) -0.584 ∗∗ 0.174 0.001 -0.926 -0.242
t ×MR (41) 0.002 0.002 0.114 -0.001 0.005
t ×MM (41) 0.011 ∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.017
SS ×MR (41) 0.049 0.074 0.503 -0.095 0.193
SS ×MM (41) 1.347 ∗∗ 0.172 < 0.001 1.009 1.684
BC (41) 2.090 ∗∗ 0.154 < 0.001 1.788 2.393
Mig. (41) -1.549 ∗∗ 0.124 < 0.001 -1.792 -1.307
POB (41) 8.120 ∗∗ 0.222 < 0.001 7.684 8.556
Int. (41) -7.232 ∗∗ 0.199 < 0.001 -7.623 -6.841
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Table S8. Summary of multinomial logit model 1, experiment 1. Because of the large
number of parameters involved, we do not show the estimates for the individual fixed
effects. They are available upon request. One and two asterisks indicate significance at the
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
Parameter Estimate Std. err. p-value Lower CI Upper CI
Ind. FE (21) – – – – –
MM (21) -0.348 0.602 0.564 -1.529 0.833
t ×MR (21) -0.001 0.002 0.555 -0.005 0.003
t ×MM (21) 0.014 ∗∗ 0.003 < 0.001 0.008 0.020
SS ×MR (21) -0.175 0.145 0.227 -0.458 0.109
SS ×MM (21) 1.659 ∗∗ 0.203 < 0.001 1.261 2.056
BC (21) -1.984 ∗∗ 0.107 < 0.001 -2.193 -1.776
Mig. (21) 0.333 ∗∗ 0.100 0.001 0.138 0.529
POB (21) -8.575 ∗∗ 0.278 < 0.001 -9.120 -8.031
Int. (21) 3.116 ∗∗ 0.421 < 0.001 2.290 3.941
Ind. FE (41) – – – – –
MM (41) -1.728 ∗∗ 0.501 0.001 -2.710 -0.746
t ×MR (41) 0.003 0.002 0.094 0.000 0.006
t ×MM (41) 0.012 ∗∗ 0.002 < 0.001 0.008 0.016
SS ×MR (41) 0.041 0.100 0.680 -0.155 0.237
SS ×MM (41) 1.620 ∗∗ 0.131 < 0.001 1.362 1.877
BC (41) 2.166 ∗∗ 0.083 < 0.001 2.004 2.327
Mig. (41) -1.589 ∗∗ 0.093 < 0.001 -1.771 -1.406
POB (41) 8.276 ∗∗ 0.206 < 0.001 7.872 8.680
Int. (41) -7.512 ∗∗ 0.396 < 0.001 -8.288 -6.735
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Table S10. Summary of multinomial logit model 1, experiment 2. Because of the large
number of parameters involved, we do not show the estimates for the individual fixed
effects. They are available upon request. One and two asterisks indicate significance at the
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
Parameter Estimate Std. err. p-value Lower CI Upper CI
Ind. FE (20/21) – – – – –
MMM (20/21) 0.2064 0.4864 0.6713 -0.7469 1.1597
t × FM (20/21) 0.0062 0.0036 0.0814 -0.0008 0.0132
t ×MMM (20/21) 0.0104 ∗∗ 0.0028 < 0.001 0.0050 0.0159
SS × FM (20/21) 0.5880 0.3005 0.0504 -0.0010 1.1770
SS ×MMM (20/21) 1.0078 ∗∗ 0.1672 < 0.001 0.6801 1.3356
BC (20/21) -2.4891 ∗∗ 0.1418 < 0.001 -2.7669 -2.2112
Mig. (20/21) 0.0998 0.1167 0.3926 -0.1290 0.3285
POB (20/21) -8.3579 ∗∗ 0.3348 < 0.001 -9.0141 -7.7017
Int. (20/21) 3.0040 ∗∗ 0.2238 < 0.001 2.5653 3.4426
Ind. FE (40/41) – – – – –
MMM (40/41) -0.3097 0.4040 0.4433 -0.5854 0.9982
t × FM (40/41) 0.0014 0.0028 0.6219 0.0008 0.0116
t ×MMM (40/41) 0.0087 ∗∗ 0.0019 < 0.001 0.0067 0.0142
SS × FM (40/41) 0.0032 0.2237 0.9886 0.1495 1.0264
SS ×MMM (40/41) 0.9492 ∗∗ 0.1235 < 0.001 0.7657 1.2500
BC (40/41) 2.8167 ∗∗ 0.1142 < 0.001 -2.7129 -2.2653
Mig. (40/41) -0.8957 ∗∗ 0.1206 < 0.001 -0.1366 0.3361
POB (40/41) 7.8361 ∗∗ 0.2557 < 0.001 -8.8591 -7.8566
Int. (40/41) -7.3090 ∗∗ 0.2421 < 0.001 2.5295 3.4784
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Figure S1. The distribution of behavior-marker choices from stage 1 for periods 2-80 in
the marker-randomized treatment. Each choice is coded, relative to the stage 1 choices
from the previous period, in one of four ways: i) behavior and marker different (−/−),
ii) behavior different and marker the same (−/+), iii) behavior the same, marker different
(+/−), or iv) behavior and marker the same (+/+). Categories (i) and (iv) are linked as
detailed in the main text.
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Figure S2. The distribution of behavior-marker choices from stage 1 for periods 2-80 in
the marker-maintained treatment. Each choice is coded, relative to the stage 1 choices
from the previous period, in one of four ways: i) behavior and marker different (−/−),
ii) behavior different and marker the same (−/+), iii) behavior the same, marker different
(+/−), or iv) behavior and marker the same (+/+). Categories (i) and (iv) are linked as
detailed in the main text.
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